

# Global Carbon Budget 2017





#### **Acknowledgements**

# The work presented here has been possible thanks to the enormous observational and modelling efforts of the institutions and networks below

#### Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> datasets

NOAA/ESRL (Dlugokencky and Tans 2017) Scripps (Keeling et al. 1976)

#### **Fossil Fuels and Industry**

CDIAC (Boden et al. 2017) USGS, 2017 UNFCCC, 2017 BP, 2017

#### **Consumption Emissions**

Peters et al. 2011 GTAP (Narayanan et al. 2015)

#### **Land-Use Change**

Houghton and Nassikas 2017 Hansis et al. 2015 GFED4 (van der Werf et al. 2017) FAO-FRA and FAOSTAT HYDE (Klein Goldewijk et al. 2017) LUH2 (Hurtt et al. 2011)

#### **Atmospheric inversions**

CarbonTracker Europe (van der Laan-Luijkx et al. 2017) Jena CarboScope (Rödenbeck et al. 2003) CAMS (Chevallier et al. 2005)

#### **Land models**

CABLE | CLASS-CTEM | CLM4.5(BGC) | DLEM | ISAM | JSBACH | JULES | LPJ-GUESS | LPJ | LPX-Bern | OCN | ORCHIDEE | ORCHIDEE-MICT | SDGVM | VISIT CRU (Harris et al. 2014)

#### **Ocean models**

CCSM-BEC | CSIRO | MITgem-REcoM2 | MPIOM-HAMOCC | MICOM-HAMOCC | NEMO-PISCES (CNRM) | NEMO-PISCES(IPSL) | NEMO-PlankTOM5 | NorESM-OC

#### pCO<sub>2</sub>-based ocean flux products

Jena CarboScope (Rödenbeck et al. 2014) Landschützer et al. 2016 SOCATv5 (Bakker et al. 2016)

Full references provided in <u>Le Quéré et al 2017</u>



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Earth Syst. Sci. Data Discuss., https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-2017-123 Manuscript under review for journal Earth Syst. Sci. Data This is just a preview and not the published paper. © Author(s) 2017. CC BY 4.0 License.



#### Global Carbon Budget 2017



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#### comment

#### Towards real-time verification of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

The Paris Agreement has increased the incentive to verify reported anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions with independent Earth system observations. Reliable verification requires a step change in our understanding of carbon cycle variability.

Glen P. Peters, Corinne Le Quéré, Robbie M. Andrew, Josep G. Canadell, Pierre Friedlingstein, Tatiana Ilyina, Robert B. Jackson, Fortunat Joos, Jan Ivar Korsbakken, Galen A. McKinley, Stephen Sitch and Pieter Tans

missions of CO, from fossil fuels and industry did not change from 2014 to -2016, yet there was a record increase in CO, concentration in the atmosphere1. This apparent inconsistency is explained by the response of the natural carbon cycle to the 2015-2016 El Niño event2, but it raises important questions about our ability to detect a sustained change in emissions from the atmospheric record. High-accuracy calibrated atmospheric measurements, diverse satellite data, and integrative modelling approaches could, and ultimately must, provide independent evidence of the effectiveness of collective action to address climate change. This verification will only be possible if we can fully filter out the background variability in atmospheric CO, concentrations driven by natural processes, a

(0.2-3.8%) and in the rest of the world of 1.9% (0.3%-3.4%) (ref. 3). The increased fossil fuel and industry emissions technically bring an end to the three years of approximately constant emissions that persisted from 2014 to 2016. Land-use change emissions in 2017 should be similar to their 2016 level5, based on fire observations using satellite data. When combining CO, emissions from fossil fuels, industry, and land-use change, we project 2017 global emissions to be 41.5 ± 4.4 billion tonnes of CO2, similar to 2015 levels. Even though the projected 2017 emissions match those of the record year in 2015, they are not expected to increase atmospheric CO, concentration as much as in 2015 because of reinvigorated carbon uptake in natural reservoirs after the 2015-2016 El Niño event (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1 | Trends in CO. emissions and atmospheri CO. concentrations. Even though CO. emissions from fossil fuel and industry, and total emissions including land-use change, have been relatively flat from 2014 to 2016, atmospheric concentrations saw a record increase in 2015 and

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#### Warning signs for stabilizing global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

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Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and industry comprise ~90% of all CO2 emissions from human activities. For the last three years, such emissions were stable, despite continuing growth in the global economy, Many positive trends contributed to this unique hiatus, including reduced coal use in China and elsewhere, continuing gains in energy efficiency, and a boom in low-carbon renewables such as wind and solar. However, the temporary hiatus appears to have ended in 2017. For 2017, we project emissions growth of 2.0% (range: 0.8%-2.9%) from 2016 levels (leap-year adjusted), reaching a record 36.8 ± 1.8 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>. Economic projections suggest further emissions growth in 2018 is likely. Time is running out on our ability to keep global average temperature

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increases below 2 °C and, even more immediately, anything close to 1.5 °C.



#### **Data Access and Additional Resources**

#### **GCP** Website



#### Global Carbon Atlas



More information, data sources and data files: <a href="http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget">http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget</a> Contact: c.lequere@uea.ac.uk

More information, data sources and data files:

www.globalcarbonatlas.org (co-funded in part by BNP Paribas Foundation)

Contact: philippe.ciais@lsce.ipsl.fr



# All the data is shown in billion tonnes CO<sub>2</sub> (GtCO<sub>2</sub>)

1 Gigatonne (Gt) = 1 billion tonnes =  $1 \times 10^{15}$ g = 1 Petagram (Pg)

1 kg carbon (C) = 3.664 kg carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>)

1 GtC = 3.664 billion tonnes  $CO_2 = 3.664$  GtCO<sub>2</sub>

(Figures in units of GtC and GtCO<sub>2</sub> are available from <a href="http://globalcarbonbudget.org/carbonbudget">http://globalcarbonbudget.org/carbonbudget</a>)

Most figures in this presentation are available for download as PDF or PNG from <u>tinyurl.com/GCB17figs</u> along with the data required to produce them.


#### Disclaimer

The Global Carbon Budget and the information presented here are intended for those interested in learning about the carbon cycle, and how human activities are changing it. The information contained herein is provided as a public service, with the understanding that the Global Carbon Project team make no warranties, either expressed or implied, concerning the accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information.



# Anthropogenic perturbation of the global carbon cycle

Perturbation of the global carbon cycle caused by anthropogenic activities, averaged globally for the decade 2007–2016 (GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr)



The budget imbalance is the difference between the estimated emissions and sinks. Source: CDIAC; NOAA-ESRL; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017




# **Fossil Fuel and Industry Emissions**



#### **Emissions from fossil fuel use and industry**

Global emissions from fossil fuel and industry: 36.2 ± 2 GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2016, 62% over 1990

Projection for 2017: 36.8 ± 2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>, 2.0% higher than 2016




Estimates for 2015 and 2016 are preliminary. Growth rate is adjusted for the leap year in 2016. Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Top emitters: fossil fuels and industry (absolute)

The top four emitters in 2016 covered 59% of global emissions China (28%), United States (15%), EU28 (10%), India (7%)



Bunker fuels are used for international transport is 3.1% of global emissions.

Statistical differences between the global estimates and sum of national totals are 0.6% of global emissions.


Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### **Emissions Projections for 2017**

Global emissions from fossil fuels and industry are projected to rise by 2.0% in 2017

The global projection has a large uncertainty, ranging from +0.8% to +3.0%




Source: CDIAC; Jackson et al 2017; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Top emitters: fossil fuels and industry (per capita)

Countries have a broad range of per capita emissions reflecting their national circumstances




Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### Top emitters: fossil fuels and industry (per dollar)

Emissions per unit economic output (emissions intensities) generally decline over time China's intensity is declining rapidly, but is still much higher than the world average




GDP is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2010 US dollars.

Source: CDIAC; IEA 2016 GDP to 2014, IMF 2017 growth rates to 2016; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Top emitters: fossil fuels and industry (bar chart)

Emissions by country from 2000 to 2016, with growth rates indicated for the more recent period of 2011 to 2016




Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# **Alternative rankings of countries**

Depending on perspective, the significance of individual countries changes.

Emissions from fossil fuels and industry.



GDP: Gross Domestic Product in Market Exchange Rates (MER) and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Source: CDIAC; United Nations; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Fossil fuel and industry emissions growth

Emissions in the US, Russia and Brazil declined in 2016
Emissions in India and all other countries combined increased





Figure shows the top four countries contributing to emissions changes in 2016 Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Breakdown of global emissions by country

Emissions from OECD countries are about the same as in 1990 Emissions from non-OECD countries have increased rapidly in the last decade




Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### Historical cumulative emissions by country

Cumulative emissions from fossil-fuel and industry were distributed (1870–2016): USA 26%, EU28 22%, China 13%, Russia 7%, Japan 4% and India 3%




Cumulative emissions (1990–2016) were distributed China 20%, USA 20%, EU28 14%, Russia 6%, India 5%, Japan 4% 'All others' includes all other countries along with bunker fuels and statistical differences Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### Historical cumulative emissions by continent

Cumulative emissions from fossil-fuel and industry (1870–2016)

North America and Europe responsible for most cumulative emissions, but Asia growing fast




The figure excludes bunker fuels and statistical differences Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Emissions from coal, oil, gas, cement


Share of global emissions in 2016: coal (40%), oil (34%), gas (19%), cement (6%), flaring (1%, not shown)



Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017

#### **Emissions by category**


Emissions by category from 2000 to 2016, with growth rates indicated for the more recent period of 2011 to 2016





#### **Energy consumption by energy type**

Energy consumption by fuel source from 2000 to 2016, with growth rates indicated for the more recent period of 2011 to 2016




Source: BP 2017; Jackson et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Fossil fuel and cement emissions growth

The biggest changes in emissions were from a decline in coal and an increase in oil




Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# **Carbon intensity of economic activity**

Global emissions growth has generally recovered quickly from previous financial crises
It is unclear if the recent slowdown in global emissions is related to the Global Financial Crisis




Economic activity is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2010 US dollars. Source: CDIAC; Peters et al 2012; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# **Emissions intensity per unit economic activity**

The 10 largest economies have a wide range of emissions intensity of economic production




Emission intensity: CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel and industry divided by Gross Domestic Product Source: Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### New generation of emissions scenarios

In the lead up to the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report new scenarios have been developed to more systematically explore key uncertainties in future socioeconomic developments




Five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) have been developed to explore challenges to adaptation and mitigation. Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs) are used to achieve target forcing levels (W/m²). Marker Scenarios are indicated.

Source: Riahi et al. 2016; IIASA SSP Database; Global Carbon Budget 2017



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
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Source: Riahi et al. 2016; IIASA SSP Database; Global Carbon Budget 2017




# Pathways that avoid 2°C of warming

According to the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) that avoid 2°C of warming, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions need to decline rapidly and cross zero emissions after 2050



# CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and economic activity

In recent years, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have been almost flat despite continued economic growth




Source: Jackson et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### **Kaya decomposition**

The Kaya decomposition demonstrates the recent relative decoupling of economic growth from CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, driven by improved energy intensity




GWP: Gross World Product (economic activity), FFI: Fossil Fuel and Industry, Energy is Primary Energy from BP statistics using the substitution accounting method Source: Jackson et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### **Emissions per capita**

The 10 most populous countries span a wide range of development and emissions per person



Emission per capita: CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel and industry divided by population Source: Global Carbon Budget 2017



# **Key statistics**

	Emissions 2016				
Region/Country	Per capita	Total		Growth 2015-16	
	tCO <sub>2</sub> per person	GtCO <sub>2</sub>	%	GtCO <sub>2</sub>	%
Global (with bunkers)	4.8	36.18	100	0.163	0.0
	OECD Countries				
OECD	9.8	12.56	34.7	-0.110	-1.1
USA	16.5	5.31	14.7	-0.100	-2.1
OECD Europe	7.0	3.42	9.5	0.000	-0.3
Japan	9.5	1.21	3.3	-0.016	-1.6
South Korea	11.7	0.60	1.6	0.003	0.3
Canada	15.5	0.56	1.6	-0.005	-1.2
	Non-OECD Countries				
Non-OECD	3.6	22.25	61.5	0.220	0.7
China	7.2	10.15	28.1	0.000	-0.3
India	1.8	2.43	6.7	0.110	4.5
Russia	11.4	1.63	4.5	-0.036	-2.4
Iran	8.2	0.66	1.8	0.014	1.9
Saudi Arabia	19.7	0.63	1.8	0.011	1.4
	International Bunkers				
Aviation and Shipping	-	1.37	3.8	0.053	4.0

Source: CDIAC; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# **Consumption-based Emissions**

Consumption—based emissions allocate emissions to the location that goods and services are consumed


Consumption-based emissions = Production/Territorial-based emissions minus emissions embodied in exports plus the emissions embodied in imports



#### **Consumption-based emissions (carbon footprint)**

Allocating fossil and industry emissions to the consumption of products provides an alternative perspective.

USA and EU28 are net importers of embodied emissions, China and India are net exporters.




Consumption-based emissions are calculated by adjusting the standard production-based emissions to account for international trade Source: Peters et al 2011; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Project 2017



#### **Consumption-based emissions (carbon footprint)**

Transfers of emissions embodied in trade from non-Annex B countries to Annex B countries grew at over 11% per year between 1990 and 2007, but have since declined at over 1% per year.




Annex B countries were used in the Kyoto Protocol, but this distinction is less relevant in the Paris Agreement Source: CDIAC; Peters et al 2011; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Major flows from production to consumption

Flows from location of generation of emissions to location of consumption of goods and services




Values for 2011. EU is treated as one region. Units: MtCO<sub>2</sub>

Source: Peters et al 2012



## Major flows from extraction to consumption

Flows from location of fossil fuel extraction to location of consumption of goods and services



Values for 2011. EU is treated as one region. Units: MtCO<sub>2</sub>
Source: Andrew et al 2013




# **Land-use Change Emissions**



### Land-use change emissions

Land-use change emissions are highly uncertain. Higher emissions in 2016 are linked to increased fires during dry El Niño conditions in tropical Asia






Estimates from two bookkeeping models, using fire-based variability from 1997 Source: Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Hansis et al 2015; van der Werf et al. 2017; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



## **Total global emissions**

Total global emissions:  $40.8 \pm 2.7$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2016, 52% over 1990 Percentage land-use change: 42% in 1960, 12% averaged 2007-2016



Land-use change estimates from two bookkeeping models, using fire-based variability from 1997


Source: CDIAC; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Hansis et al 2015; van der Werf et al. 2017;

Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



## Total global emissions by source

#### Land-use change was the dominant source of annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions until around 1950




Others: Emissions from cement production and gas flaring

Source: CDIAC; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Hansis et al 2015; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



### Historical cumulative emissions by source

Land-use change represents about 31% of cumulative emissions over 1870–2016, coal 32%, oil 25%, gas 10%, and others 3%



Source: CDIAC; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Hansis et al 2015; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# **Closing the Global Carbon Budget**



## Fate of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (2007–2016)





34.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr 88%



12% 4.9 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr

Sinks

17.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr 47%



30% 11.2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr



23% 8.7 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr



Budget Imbalance:

(the difference between estimated sources & sinks)


6%

2.1 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr



#### **Global carbon budget**

Carbon emissions are partitioned among the atmosphere and carbon sinks on land and in the ocean The "imbalance" between total emissions and total sinks reflects the gap in our understanding




Source: CDIAC; NOAA-ESRL; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Hansis et al 2015; Joos et al 2013; Khatiwala et al. 2013; DeVries 2014; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### Changes in the budget over time

The sinks have continued to grow with increasing emissions, but climate change will affect carbon cycle processes in a way that will exacerbate the increase of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere



The budget imbalance is the total emissions minus the estimated growth in the atmosphere, land and ocean. It reflects the limits of our understanding of the carbon cycle.


Source: CDIAC; NOAA-ESRL; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Hansis et al 2015; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



## **Atmospheric concentration**

The atmospheric concentration growth rate has shown a steady increase


The high growth in 1987, 1998, & 2015-16 reflect a strong El Niño, which weakens the land sink



Source: NOAA-ESRL; Global Carbon Budget 2017

#### Ocean sink

# The ocean carbon sink continues to increase 8.7±2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr for 2007–2016 and 9.6±2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr in 2016




Source: SOCATv5; Bakker et al 2016; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### **Terrestrial sink**

The land sink was 11.2±3 GtCO2/yr during 2007-2016 and 10±3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr in 2016 Total CO<sub>2</sub> fluxes on land (including land-use change) are constrained by atmospheric inversions




Global Carbon Project

Source: Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



#### **Total land and ocean fluxes**

#### Total land and ocean fluxes show more interannual variability in the tropics




Global Carbon Project

Source: Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



### Remaining carbon budget imbalance

Large and unexplained variability in the global carbon balance caused by uncertainty and understanding hinder independent verification of reported CO<sub>2</sub> emissions



positive values mean overestimated emissions and/or underestimated sinks

The budget imbalance is the carbon left after adding independent estimates for total emissions, minus the atmospheric growth rate and estimates for the land and ocean carbon sinks using models constrained by observations

Source: Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



### **Global carbon budget**

The cumulative contributions to the global carbon budget from 1870

The carbon imbalance represents the gap in our current understanding of sources and sinks





Figure concept from **Shrink That Footprint** 

Source: <u>CDIAC</u>; <u>NOAA-ESRL</u>; <u>Houghton and Nassikas 2017</u>; <u>Hansis et al 2015</u>; <u>Joos et al 2013</u>; <u>Khatiwala et al. 2013</u>; <u>DeVries 2014</u>; <u>Le Quéré et al 2017</u>; <u>Global Carbon Budget 2016</u>



### **Atmospheric concentration**

The global CO<sub>2</sub> concentration increased from ~277ppm in 1750 to 403ppm in 2016 (up 45%) 2016 was the first full year with concentration above 400ppm




Globally averaged surface atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. Data from: NOAA-ESRL after 1980; the Scripps Institution of Oceanography before 1980 (harmonised to recent data by adding 0.542ppm) Source: NOAA-ESRL; Scripps Institution of Oceanography; Le Quéré et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Trends in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and concentrations

Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration had record growth in 2015 & 2016 due to record high emissions and El Niño conditions, but growth is expected to reduce due to the end of El Niño




Source: Peters et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



## **Verification of a sustained change in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions**

Our ability to detect changes in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on atmospheric observations is limited by our understanding of carbon cycle variability




Observations show a large-interannual to decadal variability, which can only be partially reconstructed through the global carbon budget. The difference between observations and reconstructed is the "budget imbalance".

Source: Peters et al 2017; Global Carbon Budget 2017



# Seasonal variation of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration

Weekly CO<sub>2</sub> concentration measured at Mauna Loa stayed above 400ppm throughout 2016 and is forecast to average 406.8 in 2017





# **End notes**




# **Infographic**





#### **Global Carbon Budget 2017**

In 2017, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuels and industry are projected to grow by 2.0% (+0.8 to +3.0%). This follows three years of nearly no growth (2014-2016)



#### The plateau of last year was not peak emissions after all...







#### ...we are changing trajectory...



#### ...but atmospheric concentrations continue to rise



Written and edited by Peo Canadell (CSIRO), Robbie Andrew and Glen Peters (CICERO), and Corinne Le Quéré (Tivndall Centre UEA)









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