



# Global Carbon Budget

# 2018

# Acknowledgements

The work presented here has been possible thanks to the enormous observational and modelling efforts of the institutions and networks below

## Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> datasets

NOAA/ESRL (Dlugokencky and Tans 2018)  
Scripps (Keeling et al. 1976)

## Fossil Fuels and Industry

CDIAC (Boden et al. 2017)  
Andrew, 2018  
UNFCCC, 2018  
BP, 2018

## Consumption Emissions

Peters et al. 2011  
GTAP (Narayanan et al. 2015)

## Land-Use Change

Houghton and Nassikas 2017  
Hansis et al. 2015  
GFED4 (van der Werf et al. 2017)  
FAO-FRA and FAOSTAT  
HYDE (Klein Goldewijk et al. 2017)  
LUH2 (Hurtt et al. in prep)

## Atmospheric inversions

CarbonTracker Europe (van der Laan-Luijkx et al. 2017)  
Jena CarboScope (Rödenbeck et al. 2003)  
CAMS (Chevallier et al. 2005)  
MIROC (Saeki and Patra, 2017)

## Land models

CABLE-POP | CLASS-CTEM | CLM5.0(BGC) | DLEM |  
ISAM | JSBACH | JULES | LPJ-GUESS | LPJ | LPX-Bern |  
OCN | ORCHIDEE-Trunk | ORCHIDEE-CNP | SDGVM |  
SURFEXv8 | VISIT  
CRU (Harris et al. 2014) JRA-55

## Ocean models

CCSM-BEC | MICOM-HAMOCC (NorESM-OC) | MITgcm-  
RECoM2 | MPIOM-HAMOCC | NEMO-PISCES (CNRM) |  
NEMO-PISCES (IPSL) | NEMO-PlankTOM5

## pCO<sub>2</sub>-based ocean flux products

Jena CarboScope (Rödenbeck et al. 2014)  
Landschützer et al. 2016  
SOCATv6 (Bakker et al. 2016)

Full references provided in [Le Quéré et al 2018](#)

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
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## Global Carbon Budget 2018

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## Emissions are still rising: ramp up the cuts

With sources of renewable energy spreading fast, all sectors can do more to decarbonize the world, argue Christiana Figueres and colleagues.

Representatives of 190 nations gather this week to review progress at the annual United Nations climate talks. They face a difficult task: cutting down emissions from fossil fuels is rising again. Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are projected to go up by 2% or more than 2% (ref. 1). In 2017 they increased by 1.6%, the largest year-on-year rise between 2014 and 2016. The reasons? The use of oil and gas keeps growing, and some countries have moved away from their economic growth (see 'Rising pressures').

The UN meetings, this year in Katowice in the heart of Poland's coalfields, mark a

checkpoint. The Paris climate agreement was adopted in 2015 — when nations signed up to limit global warming well below 2 °C compared with pre-industrial levels. The first round of national emissions-reduction targets are in 2020.

To be back on track, the revised targets must be more ambitious than those pledged in 2015. As we argued last year in *Nature*<sup>2</sup>, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions must start to fall by 2020 if we are to meet the temperature goals of the Paris agreement.

Every year of rising emissions puts communities and the homes, lives and livelihoods

of billions of people at risk. It commits us to the effects of climate change for centuries to come. Already, the terrible impacts of 1 °C of warming are becoming evident. Disasters triggered by weather and climate in 2017 cost the global economy US\$300 billion, and around 100 million were left (see [go.nature.com/2f6y2dy](http://go.nature.com/2f6y2dy)). The full costs of 2018's disasters have yet to be tallied — including Typhoon Mangkhut, Hurricane Florence, severe heatwaves and wildfires that have ravaged swathes of Europe and the United States. These events are likely to confirm our

### EDITORIAL

#### Global energy growth is outpacing decarbonization

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#### Abstract


Recent reports have highlighted the challenge of keeping global average temperatures below 2 °C and — even more so — 1.5 °C (IPCC 2018 *Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Special Report*, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Fossil-fuel burning and cement production release ~90% of all CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from human activities. After a three-year hiatus with stable global emissions (Jackson *et al.* 2016 *Nat. Clim. Change* 6:7–10; Le Quéré *et al.* 2018 *Earth Syst. Sci. Data* 10:405–448; IEA 2018 CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion 2018, International Energy Agency <https://webstore.iea.org/co2-emissions-from-fuel-combustion-2018>), CO<sub>2</sub> emissions grew by 1.6% in 2017 to 36.2 Gt (billion tonnes), and are expected to grow further 2.7% in 2018 (range: 1.8%–3.7%) to a record 37.1 ± 2 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> (Le Quéré *et al.* 2018b). Additional increases in 2019 remain uncertain but appear likely because of persistent growth in oil and natural gas use and strong growth projected for the global economy. Coal use has slowed markedly in the last few years, potentially peaking, but its future trajectory remains uncertain. Despite positive progress in ~20 countries whose economies have grown over the last decade and their emissions have declined, growth in energy use from fossil-fuel sources is still outpacing the rise of low-carbon sources and activities. A robust global economy, insufficient emission reductions in developed countries, and a need for increased energy use in developing countries where per capita emissions remain far below those of wealthier nations will continue to put upward pressure on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Peak emissions will occur only when total fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions finally start to decline despite growth in global energy consumption, with fossil energy production replaced by rapidly growing low- or no-carbon technologies.

<https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07585-6>

<https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aaf303>

# Data Access and Additional Resources

## Global Carbon Budget



**Global Carbon Budget**

**Carbon Budget 2018**

An annual update of the global carbon budget and trends

Published 5 December 2018

| HIGHLIGHTS   | Governance  |
|--|---|
| Publications<br>Papers, Contributors and how to cite Budget 2018 | Presentation<br>Powerpoint and figures on Budget 2018 |
| Infographics supporting Budget 2018                              | Images<br>Images available for media coverage         |
|  | Visualisations<br>Visualisations of the carbon cycle  |

Archive Data from previous carbon budgets

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## Global Carbon Atlas



**GLOBAL CARBON ATLAS**

Global Carbon Atlas is a platform to explore and visualize the most up-to-date data on carbon fluxes resulting from human activities and natural processes. Human impacts on the carbon cycle are the most important cause of climate change.

**Release 2018**

CO2 Emissions

CO2 Emissions

CH4 Emissions

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More information, data sources and data files:  
<http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget>  
 Contact: [Pep.Canadell@csiro.au](mailto:Pep.Canadell@csiro.au)

More information, data sources and data files:  
[www.globalcarbonatlas.org](http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org)  
 (co-funded in part by BNP Paribas Foundation)  
 Contact: [philippe.ciais@lsce.ipsl.fr](mailto:philippe.ciais@lsce.ipsl.fr)

All the data is shown in billion tonnes CO<sub>2</sub> (GtCO<sub>2</sub>)

1 Gigatonne (Gt) = 1 billion tonnes =  $1 \times 10^{15}$ g = 1 Petagram (Pg)

1 kg carbon (C) = 3.664 kg carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>)

1 GtC = 3.664 billion tonnes CO<sub>2</sub> = 3.664 GtCO<sub>2</sub>

(Figures in units of GtC and GtCO<sub>2</sub> are available from <http://globalcarbonbudget.org/carbonbudget>)


Most figures in this presentation are available for download as PNG files  
from [tinyurl.com/GCB18figs](http://tinyurl.com/GCB18figs) along with the data required to produce them.

## Disclaimer

The Global Carbon Budget and the information presented here are intended for those interested in learning about the carbon cycle, and how human activities are changing it. The information contained herein is provided as a public service, with the understanding that the Global Carbon Project team make no warranties, either expressed or implied, concerning the accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information.

# Anthropogenic perturbation of the global carbon cycle

Perturbation of the global carbon cycle caused by anthropogenic activities, averaged globally for the decade 2008–2017 (GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr)



The budget imbalance is the difference between the estimated emissions and sinks.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [NOAA-ESRL](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Ciais et al. 2013](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions

from fossil fuel use and industry

# Global Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions

Global fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions:  $36.2 \pm 2$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2017, 63% over 1990

- Projection for 2018:  $37.1 \pm 2$  GtCO<sub>2</sub>, 2.7% higher than 2017 (range 1.8% to 3.7%)




Uncertainty is  $\pm 5\%$  for one standard deviation (IPCC “likely” range)

Estimates for 2015, 2016 and 2017 are preliminary; 2018 is a projection based on partial data.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Global Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions


Global fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have risen steadily over the last decades.  
The peak in global emissions is not yet in sight.



Estimates for 2015, 2016 and 2017 are preliminary ; 2018 is a projection based on partial data.  
Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Emissions Projections for 2018

Global fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are projected to rise by 2.7% in 2018 [range: +1.8% to +3.7%]  
 The global growth is driven by the underlying changes at the country level.



# Top emitters: Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

The top four emitters in 2017 covered 58% of global emissions  
 China (27%), United States (15%), EU28 (10%), India (7%)




Bunker fuels, used for international transport, are 3.2% of global emissions.

Statistical differences between the global estimates and sum of national totals are 0.7% of global emissions.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Top emitters: Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions per capita

Countries have a broad range of per capita emissions reflecting their national circumstances



# Top emitters: Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Intensity

Emission intensity (emission per unit economic output) generally declines over time.  
In many countries, these declines are insufficient to overcome economic growth.




GDP is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2010 US dollars.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [IEA 2017](#) GDP to 2015, [IMF 2018](#) growth rates to 2017; [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Alternative rankings of countries

The responsibility of individual countries depends on perspective.  
 Bars indicate fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, population, and GDP.



GDP: Gross Domestic Product in Market Exchange Rates (MER) and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)  
 Source: [CDIAC](#); [United Nations](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions growth: 2016–2017

Emissions in the China, India, and Turkey increased most in 2017  
Emissions in USA declined, while all other countries combined increased





Figure shows the top four countries contributing to emissions changes in 2017  
Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions growth: 2018 projection


Emissions in China, India, and the US are expected to increase in 2018, while emissions in the EU28 are expected to decline, and all other countries combined will most likely increase



Our projection considers China, USA, EU28, and India independently, and the Others as an aggregated “Rest of World”  
 Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Breakdown of global fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by country

Emissions in OECD countries have increased by 5% since 1990, while those in non-OECD countries have more than doubled



# Historical cumulative fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by country

Cumulative fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were distributed (1870–2017):  
USA 25%, EU28 22%, China 13%, Russia 7%, Japan 4% and India 3%



CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/UNFCCC/BP/USGS


Cumulative emissions (1990–2017) were distributed China 20%, USA 20%, EU28 14%, Russia 6%, India 5%, Japan 4%

'All others' includes all other countries along with bunker fuels and statistical differences

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by continent

Asia dominates global fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, while emissions in North America are of similar size to those in Europe, and the Middle East is growing rapidly.



# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by continent: per capita

Oceania and North America have the highest per capita emissions, while the Middle East has recently overtaken Europe. Africa has by far the lowest emissions per capita.




The global average was 4.8 tonnes per capita in 2017.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Historical cumulative emissions by continent

Cumulative fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (1870–2017). North America and Europe have contributed the most cumulative emissions, but Asia is growing fast




The figure excludes bunker fuels and statistical differences

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity


Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions growth has generally resumed quickly from financial crises.  
 Emission intensity has steadily declined but not sufficiently to offset economic growth.



Economic activity is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2010 US dollars.  
 Source: [CDIAC](#); [Peters et al 2012](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Kaya decomposition

The Kaya decomposition illustrates that relative decoupling of economic growth from CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is driven by improved energy intensity (Energy/GWP)



# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity


The 10 largest economies have a wide range of emission intensity of economic activity



Emission intensity: Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions divided by Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
Source: [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions per capita

The 10 most populous countries span a wide range of development and emissions per capita



Emission per capita: Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions divided by population  
 Source: [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Key statistics


| Region/Country                         | Emissions 2017                            |                            |            |                                     |                     |  |
|--|---|----------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|--|
|  | Per capita<br>tCO <sub>2</sub> per person | Total<br>GtCO <sub>2</sub> | Total<br>% | Growth 2016–17<br>GtCO <sub>2</sub> | Growth 2016–17<br>% |  |
| Global (with bunkers)                  | 4.8                                       | 36.15                      | 100        | 0.478                               | 0.0                 |  |
| <b>OECD Countries</b>                  |   |                            |            |                                     |                     |  |
| OECD                                   | 9.8                                       | 12.67                      | 35.0       | 0.061                               | 0.8                 |  |
| USA                                    | 16.2                                      | 5.27                       | 14.6       | -0.041                              | -0.5                |  |
| OECD Europe                            | 7.1                                       | 3.46                       | 9.6        | 0.034                               | 1.3                 |  |
| Japan                                  | 9.5                                       | 1.21                       | 3.3        | 0.001                               | 0.3                 |  |
| South Korea                            | 12.1                                      | 0.62                       | 1.7        | 0.021                               | 3.8                 |  |
| Canada                                 | 15.6                                      | 0.57                       | 1.6        | 0.015                               | 2.9                 |  |
| <b>Non-OECD Countries</b>              |   |                            |            |                                     |                     |  |
| Non-OECD                               | 3.5                                       | 22.08                      | 61.1       | 0.388                               | 2.1                 |  |
| China                                  | 7.0                                       | 9.84                       | 27.2       | 0.134                               | 1.7                 |  |
| India                                  | 1.8                                       | 2.47                       | 6.8        | 0.089                               | 4.0                 |  |
| Russia                                 | 11.8                                      | 1.69                       | 4.7        | 0.025                               | 1.8                 |  |
| Iran                                   | 8.3                                       | 0.67                       | 1.9        | 0.035                               | 5.7                 |  |
| Saudi Arabia                           | 19.3                                      | 0.64                       | 1.8        | 0.003                               | 0.8                 |  |
| <b>International Bunkers</b>           |   |                            |            |                                     |                     |  |
| Bunkers and<br>statistical differences | -   | 1.41                       | 3.9        | 0.029                               | 2.1                 |  |

# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions by source

from fossil fuel use and industry


# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions by source

Share of global fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2017:  
 coal (40%), oil (35%), gas (20%), cement (4%), flaring (1%, not shown)



# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions by source

Emissions by category from 2000 to 2017, with growth rates indicated for the more recent period of 2012 to 2017




© Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/UNFCCC/BP/USGS

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Jackson et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2017](#)

# Energy use by source

Energy consumption by fuel source from 2000 to 2017, with growth rates indicated for the more recent period of 2012 to 2017




CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: BP

This figure shows “primary energy” using the BP substitution method  
(non-fossil sources are scaled up by an assumed fossil efficiency of 0.38)

Source: [BP 2018](#); [Jackson et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions growth by source

All fossil fuels contributed to the growth in fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2017




# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Projections

## 2018

from fossil fuel use and industry


# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in China

China's emissions are dominated by coal use, with strong and sustained growth in oil & gas  
 The recent declines in coal emissions may soon be undone if the return growth persists




# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in USA

USA CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have declined since 2007, driven by coal being displaced by gas, solar, & wind. Oil use has returned to growth. Emissions growth in 2018 is driven partly by weather.




# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in the European Union (EU28)

Emissions in the EU28 declined steadily from 2008 (the Global Financial Crisis) to 2014, but oil and gas emissions are growing again. A small decline is expected in 2018.



# Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in India


India's emissions are growing strongly along with rapid growth in economic activity. Although India is rapidly deploying solar & wind power, coal continues to grow very strongly.



# Emission scenarios

# Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs)

The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) are a set of five socioeconomic narratives that are used by Integrated Assessment Models to estimate potential future emission pathways




Global Carbon Project

Marker Scenarios are in bold. Net emissions include those from land-use change and bioenergy with CCS.  
 Source: [Riahi et al. 2016](#); [Rogelj et al. 2018](#); [IIASA SSP Database](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs)

The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) lead to a broad range in baselines (grey), with more aggressive mitigation leading to lower temperature outcomes (grouped by colours)




Global Carbon Project

This set of quantified SSPs are based on the output of six Integrated Assessment Models (AIM/CGE, GCAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE, REMIND, WITCH). Net emissions include those from land-use change and bioenergy with CCS.

Source: [Riahi et al. 2016](#); [Rogelj et al. 2018](#); [IIASA SSP Database](#); [IAMC](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# The IPCC Special Report on “Global Warming of 1.5°C”

The IPCC Special Report on “Global Warming of 1.5°C” presented new scenarios:  
 1.5°C scenarios require halving emissions by ~2030, net-zero by ~2050, and negative thereafter



Net emissions include those from land-use change and bioenergy with CCS.

Source: [Huppmann et al 2018](#); [IAMC 1.5C Scenario Database](#); [IPCC SR15](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


## Nature commentary

# Emissions are still rising: ramp up the cuts

With sources of renewable energy spreading fast, all sectors can do more to decarbonize the world, argue **Christiana Figueres** and colleagues.

# Rising pressures


$\text{CO}_2$  emissions are growing after pausing for a few years. Clean energy sources are beginning to replace fossil fuels, as their costs become more competitive.



Source: [Figueres et al 2018; Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Energy use by source

Renewable energy is growing exponentially, but this growth has so far been too low to offset the growth in fossil energy consumption.



This figure shows “primary energy” using the BP substitution method  
 (non-fossil sources are scaled up by an assumed fossil efficiency of 0.38)

Source: [BP 2018](#); [Figuères et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Environmental Research Letters

## Commentary

Environmental Research Letters

### EDITORIAL

#### Global energy growth is outpacing decarbonization

R B Jackson<sup>1</sup> , C Le Quéré<sup>2</sup>, R M Andrew<sup>3</sup> , J G Canadell<sup>4</sup>, J I Korsbakken<sup>3</sup>, Z Liu<sup>2</sup>, G P Peters<sup>3</sup>  and B Zheng<sup>5</sup> 

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<sup>2</sup> Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom


<sup>3</sup> CICERO Center for International Climate Research, PO Box 1129 Blindern, NO-0318 Oslo, Norway

<sup>4</sup> Global Carbon Project, CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia

<sup>5</sup> Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l'Environnement, CEA-CNRS-UVSQ, UMR 8212, Gif-sur-Yvette, France

# CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and economic activity

The global economy continues to grow faster than emissions. A step change is needed in emission intensity improvements to drive emissions down.




$$\text{CO}_2 = \text{CO}_2 \text{ intensity} \times \text{GDP}$$

Source: [Jackson et al 2018; Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Top emitters: Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions


Emissions by country from 2000 to 2017, with the growth rates indicated for the more recent period of 2012 to 2017



© Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/UNFCCC/BP/USGS

# Per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions


The US has high per capita emissions, but this has been declining steadily. China's per capita emissions have levelled out and is now the same as the EU. India's emissions are low per capita.



CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/UNFCCC/BP/USGS


# Per capita energy use

There are large differences in energy use per capita between countries, with some differences to emissions per capita due to differences in the country-level energy mix




# Emissions must decline rapidly

CO<sub>2</sub> emissions need to rapidly decline to follow pathways consistent with the Paris targets  
(Projection for 2018 emissions in red)



# Energy use in China


Coal consumption in energy units may have already peaked in China, while consumption of all other energy sources is growing strongly



Source: [BP 2018](#); [Jackson et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Energy use in USA

Coal consumption has declined sharply in recent years with the shale gas boom and strong renewables growth. Growth in oil consumption has resumed.




# Energy use in the European Union

Consumption of both oil and gas has rebounded in recent years, while coal continues to decline. Renewables are growing strongly.



# Energy use in India

Consumption of coal and oil in India is growing very strongly, as are renewables, albeit from a lower base.




# Consumption-based Emissions

Consumption–based emissions allocate emissions to the location that goods and services are consumed

Consumption-based emissions = Production/Territorial-based emissions minus emissions embodied in exports plus the emissions embodied in imports

# Consumption-based emissions (carbon footprint)

Allocating fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to consumption provides an alternative perspective.  
 USA and EU28 are net importers of embodied emissions, China and India are net exporters.




cc © Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/GCP/Peters et al 2011

Consumption-based emissions are calculated by adjusting the standard production-based emissions to account for international trade  
 Source: [Peters et al 2011](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Project 2018](#)

# Consumption-based emissions per person

The differences between fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita is larger than the differences between consumption and territorial emissions.




CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/GCP/UN/Peters et al 2011

Consumption-based emissions are calculated by adjusting the standard production-based emissions to account for international trade  
Source: [Peters et al 2011](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Project 2018](#)


# Consumption-based emissions (carbon footprint)

Transfers of emissions embodied in trade between OECD and non-OECD countries grew slowly during the 2000's, but has since slowly declined.




# Major flows from production to consumption

Flows from location of generation of emissions to location of consumption of goods and services



# Major flows from extraction to consumption

Flows from location of fossil fuel extraction to location of consumption of goods and services




Values for 2011. EU is treated as one region. Units:  $\text{MtCO}_2$

Source: [Andrew et al 2013](#)

# Land-use Change Emissions

# Land-use change emissions

Land-use change emissions are highly uncertain, with no clear trend in the last decade.



CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: GCP


Estimates from two bookkeeping models, using fire-based variability from 1997

Source: [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [van der Werf et al. 2017](#);  
[Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Total global emissions

Total global emissions:  $41.2 \pm 2.8 \text{ GtCO}_2$  in 2017, 53% over 1990

Percentage land-use change: 43% in 1960, 13% averaged 2008–2017



Fossil carbon



Land-use  
change


CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/UNFCCC/BP/USGS/GCP

Land-use change estimates from two bookkeeping models, using fire-based variability from 1997

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [van der Werf et al. 2017](#);  
[Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Total global emissions by source

Land-use change was the dominant source of annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions until around 1950.  
Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions now dominate global changes.




Others: Emissions from cement production and gas flaring

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Historical cumulative emissions by source

Land-use change represents about 31% of cumulative emissions over 1870–2017,  
coal 32%, oil 25%, gas 10%, and others 2%



Others: Emissions from cement production and gas flaring

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Closing the Global Carbon Budget

# Fate of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (2008–2017)



**Sources = Sinks**

34.4 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr  
**87%**



**13%**  
5.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr

17.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr

**44%**

**29%**

11.6 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr



**22%**

8.9 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr



**Budget Imbalance:**


(the difference between estimated sources & sinks)

**5%**

1.9 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr

# Global carbon budget


Carbon emissions are partitioned among the atmosphere and carbon sinks on land and in the ocean  
 The “imbalance” between total emissions and total sinks reflects the gap in our understanding



Source: [CDIAC](#); [NOAA-ESRL](#); [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [Joos et al 2013](#); [Khatiwala et al. 2013](#); [DeVries 2014](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Changes in the budget over time

The sinks have continued to grow with increasing emissions, but climate change will affect carbon cycle processes in a way that will exacerbate the increase of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere




The budget imbalance is the total emissions minus the estimated growth in the atmosphere, land and ocean.  
It reflects the limits of our understanding of the carbon cycle.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [NOAA-ESRL](#); [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)


# Atmospheric concentration

The atmospheric concentration growth rate has shown a steady increase  
The high growth in 1987, 1998, & 2015–16 reflect a strong El Niño, which weakens the land sink



# Ocean sink

The ocean carbon sink continues to increase  
 $8.9 \pm 2 \text{ GtCO}_2/\text{yr}$  for 2008–2017 and  $9.2 \pm 2 \text{ GtCO}_2/\text{yr}$  in 2017




Source: [SOCATv6](#); [Bakker et al 2016](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

Individual estimates from: Aumont and Bopp (2006); Berthet et al. (2018); Buitenhuis et al. (2010); Doney et al. (2009); Hauck et al. (2016); Landschützer et al. (2016); Mauritsen et al. (2018); Rödenbeck et al. (2014); Schwinger et al. (2016). Full references provided in Le Quéré et al. (2018).

# Terrestrial sink

The land sink was  $11.6 \pm 3$  GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr during 2008–2017 and  $13.9 \pm 3$  GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr in 2017

Total CO<sub>2</sub> fluxes on land (including land-use change) are constrained by atmospheric inversions




CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: GCP

Source: [Le Quéré et al 2018](#) (see Table 4 for detailed references)

# Total land and ocean fluxes

Total land and ocean fluxes show more interannual variability in the tropics




CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: GCP

Source: [Le Quéré et al 2018](#) (see Table 4 for detailed references)

# Remaining carbon budget imbalance

Large and unexplained variability in the global carbon balance caused by uncertainty and understanding hinder independent verification of reported CO<sub>2</sub> emissions




The budget imbalance is the carbon left after adding independent estimates for total emissions, minus the atmospheric growth rate and estimates for the land and ocean carbon sinks using models constrained by observations

Source: [Le Quéré et al 2018; Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Global carbon budget

The cumulative contributions to the global carbon budget from 1870  
 The carbon imbalance represents the gap in our current understanding of sources & sinks




CC BY Global Carbon Project • Data: CDIAC/GCP/NOAA-ESRL/UNFCCC/BP/USGS

Figure concept from [Shrink That Footprint](#)

Source: [CDIAC](#); [NOAA-ESRL](#); [Houghton and Nassikas 2017](#); [Hansis et al 2015](#); [Joos et al 2013](#); [Khatiwala et al. 2013](#); [DeVries 2014](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Atmospheric concentration


The global CO<sub>2</sub> concentration increased from ~277ppm in 1750 to 405ppm in 2017 (up 46%)  
2016 was the first full year with concentration above 400ppm



Globally averaged surface atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. Data from: NOAA-ESRL after 1980; the Scripps Institution of Oceanography before 1980 (harmonised to recent data by adding 0.542ppm)  
Source: [NOAA-ESRL](#); [Scripps Institution of Oceanography](#); [Le Quéré et al 2018](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2018](#)

# Seasonal variation of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration

Weekly CO<sub>2</sub> concentration measured at Mauna Loa stayed above 400ppm throughout 2016 and is forecast to average 408.9 in 2018



Forecasts are [an update](#) of [Betts et al 2016](#). The deviation from monthly observations is 0.24 ppm (RMSE).

Updates of [this figure](#) are available, and [another](#) on the drivers of the atmospheric growth

Data source: Tans and Keeling (2018), [NOAA-ESRL](#), [Scripps Institution of Oceanography](#)


# End notes

## Global Carbon Budget 2018

Renewables rising fast but not yet enough to reverse emissions trend


Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are projected to rise **more than 2%**

Efforts to decarbonise are not yet strong enough to overcome growing global energy needs




**Coal is changing trajectory, renewables are rising, oil & gas continue unabated**

Renewables are rising from a low base




Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita of the top emitting countries, 2000-17



**The rise in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> causes climate change**

The global carbon cycle 2008-2017



Produced by the Future Earth Media Lab for the Global Carbon Project. <http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/index.htm>. Written and edited by Corinne Le Quéré (Tyndall Centre UEA) with the Global Carbon Budget team. Impacts based on IPCC SR15. Graphic by Nigel Hawtin. Credits: Le Quéré et al. Earth System Science Data (2019); NOAA/ESRL and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography; illustrative projections by D. van Vuuren based on the IMAGE model.

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# futureearth


Research. Innovation. Sustainability.



We also want thank each of the many funding agencies that supported the individual components of this release. A full list is provided in Table A5 of Le Quéré et al. 2018.  
<https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-10-2141-2018>

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# Global Carbon Project

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